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INTRODUCTION
My remarks will focus on the current state of affairs related to
international criminal law. I believe we are in many ways at a
crossroads. Which path we take as a global community will change
the face of international criminal law, maybe forever. We face many
challenges, but before I review them with you all, let me tell you a
bit about our work in facing down terrorists, warlords, and thugs in
West Africa-very much a forgotten part of the world.
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Syracuse University College of Law; former
Chief Prosecutor of the international criminal war crimes tribunal in West Africa,
called the Special Court for Sierra Leone (2002-2005). This article is an expanded
version of remarks presented at a conference on "International Criminal Tribunals
in the 21 st Century" hosted by the War Crimes Research Office of the Washington
College of Law, American University, on September 30, 2005.
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I. THE REQUEST
In March of 1991, the tragedy of the civil war in Sierra Leone
began with an invasion from Liberia into the eastern diamond fields
of that back water of a country.' The invasion consisted of various
units and criminal elements from across West Africa, including the
Revolutionary United Front led by Foday Sankoh, Guineans,
Burkinaps, Liberians, and Special Forces from Libya.
For over ten years, a joint criminal enterprise, led by then
President Charles Taylor2 on behalf of Muammar Qadhafi, murdered,
raped, maimed, and mutilated around 1.2 million human beings to
further its own personal criminal purposes by moving diamonds
about for guns and cash.3 These guns and cash were used in the
overall geopolitical plan to turn all of West Africa into a Libyan
fiefdom. Many of the players in this horror were graduates of the
terrorist training camps in Libya. In this internal armed conflict, the
combatants committed atrocities beyond description. Sierra Leone
became a killing field, truly a hell on earth.
In June of 2000, the President of Sierra Leone, Tejan Kabbah, a
retired United Nations employee, wrote the Secretary General of the
1. For an overview on the events surrounding the invasion and the actors
involved in the conflict, see U.S. State Dep't, Bureau of African Affairs,
Background Note: Sierra Leone (Sept. 2005), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/
bgn/5475.htm.
2. Charles Taylor was President of Liberia from 1997-2003. Further
information on Liberia can be found at U.S. State Dep't, Bureau of African
Affairs, Background Note: Liberia (Jan. 2006), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/
bgn/6618.htm.
3. See U.N. Sec. Council, Report of the Security Council Mission to Sierra
Leone, 42-43, U.N. Doc. S/2000/992 (Oct. 16, 2000) (expressing the general
sentiment that Charles Taylor was connected to the illegal trade in diamonds and
guns, although he denied accusations of such involvement). Commenting on
former President Taylor's role in the atrocities, the Security Council report noted:
Regional leaders were clearly of the opinion that President Taylor's
relationship with [the Revolutionary United Front] was a key to the situation
in Sierra Leone, and that continued action was necessary to persuade him to
use his influence to positive, rather than negative, effect. Illicit trafficking in
diamonds and arms, the proliferation and encouragement of thuggish militias
and armed groups, and the massive flows of refugees and internally displaced
persons resulting from their activities must be addressed directly.
Id. 54(d).
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United Nations, Kofi Annan, asking him for assistance in developing
an accounting mechanism for the apparent war crimes and crimes
against humanity perpetrated in his country.4 The domestic court
system, in large part, no longer existed and was incapable in dealing
with prosecuting up to 30,000 alleged perpetrators.5
II. THE RESPONSE
Faced with the enormity of the tragedy, the United Nations was
compelled to act, despite a great deal of initial reluctance. At the
time, the world was frustrated with the cost of international criminal
justice. The International Criminal Court did not exist and the ad hoc
tribunals were moving slowly forward with no end in sight, as
neither had a prosecution plan nor an exit strategy.6 The cost was
enormous, coming in at over 250 million dollars per year to sustain
the effort in The Hague and Arusha.7 The Security Council was not
going to sanction another ad hoc effort. The question at the time was:
4. Letter Dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra
Leone to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council,
Annex, U.N. Doc. S/2000/786 (Aug. 10, 2000) (relaying the June 12th letter from
Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah).
5. See Press Release, The Hon. Solomon E. Berewa, Attomey-General and
Minister of Justice for the Republic of Sierra Leone, Remarks for Signing
Ceremony for Agreement for Special Court (Jan. 16, 2002) (highlighting the
necessity of the Special Court in holding accountable and bringing to justice
persons charged with grave crimes, by alluding to its inability to deal with
punishing such atrocities due to the "erosion of the rule of law" in Sierra Leone),
available at http://specialcourt.org/documents/PlanningMission/PressReleases/
BerewaSpeech.html.
6. The two ad hoc tribunals referred to are the International Criminal Tribunal
for Yugoslavia ("ICTY") and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR").
7. See generally S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993)
(establishing The Hague, Netherlands as the seat of the ICTY); S.C. Res. 977, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/977 (Feb. 22, 1995) (establishing Arusha, Tanzania as the seat of the
ICTR). For more specific information on the operating costs of the tribunals, see
Fact Sheet General Information, ICTR, http://65.18.216.88/ENGLISH/geninfo/
index.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2006) (reporting the annual budget for 2004-2005
as $255,909,500); and Fact Sheet General Information, ICTY, http://www.un.org/
icty/cases-e/factsheets/generalinfo-e.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2006) (reporting the
annual budget for 2004-2005 as $271,854,600).
2006] 507
AM. U. INT'L L. REv.
Could international criminal justice be effectively and efficiently
applied in a politically acceptable time frame?
In August of 2000, the Security Council passed a resolution
calling upon the Secretary General to study the problem and
recommend an alternative accounting mechanism for dealing with
what took place in Sierra Leone.8 The result was the development of
the world's first hybrid international war crimes tribunal, which
would be called the Special Court for Sierra Leone. In January of
2002, the United Nations, on behalf of the international community,
signed a treaty with the Republic of Sierra Leone creating this bold
new experiment in international accountability. 9
In April of that same year, I was appointed Chief Prosecutor, and I
arrived in Sierra Leone in August 2002 with a ten phase prosecution
plan. We were already in phase three when I arrived on that rainy
day with my special assistant and political advisor, along with my
Chief of Investigations. I had three suit cases and no place to live, yet
we went straight to work according to the plan.
III. THE MANDATE
Our mandate was to prosecute those who bore the "greatest
responsibility" for war crimes and crimes against humanity
stemming from the ten-year long civil war in Sierra Leone. 10
International tribunals are understood to be creatures of political
events, and their conception is one of political compromise. The
compromise for this international tribunal was "greatest
responsibility."
The international community got it right this time. This mandate
allowed me to accomplish my goals within a politically acceptable
time frame. The efficiency and effectiveness aspects of the charge by
8. S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000).
9. Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra
Leone on Establishing a Special Court for Sierra Leone (with Statute), Jan. 16,
2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137.
10. See id. pmbl., 2178 U.N.T.S. at 138 (charging the Secretary-General and
the Government of Sierra Leone to "create an independent special court to
prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for the commission of
serious violations of international humanitarian law and crimes committed under
Sierra Leonean law").
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the Security Council were up to my plan and the hard work of the
Office of the Prosecutor, working closely together with the Registrar
and his team.
IV. THE EXECUTION
As I have alluded to, I developed a plan that laid out our work in
Sierra Leone over a period of three tQ four years. The phases and
milestones followed a standard common law pattern. Frankly, it was
not rocket science, just good old common sense, dedication, and hard
work. The plan was broken down into five parts: office set up;
investigation/indictment; pre-trial; trial; and appeals. Currently, we
are in part four, with part five just around the comer in 2006.
Our execution of the plan called for some unique and innovative
ideas. They incorporated: (1) the creation of an academic
consortium; (2) the establishment of an outreach and legacy plan that
included the town hall program; (3) the setup of a witness
management program; and finally (4) the institution of new charges
and a new format for the indictments.
A. ACADEMIC CONSORTIUM
Designed to be an education program for law students, as well as a
support mechanism for the Office of the Prosecutor, the academic
consortium proved its worth by saving my office countless hours and
millions of dollars in attorney time. As an education program,
hundreds of law students have had the unique opportunity to be
involved in a real world international prosecution. Their work
product, supervised by professors, has been exceptional and has
contributed to the advancement of international criminal law. The
Washington College of Law has been a member and its students have
been important in this overall support to the Office of the Prosecutor.
B. OUTREACH AND LEGACY PROGRAM
It must be understood that an international war crimes tribunal is
for and about the victims, their families, their towns, and their
districts. A busy tribunal tends to lose sight of this important fact.
After all, it is the people who will have to live with the results; thus it
is imperative that they understand and respect the process. This can
2006] 509
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only be done by reaching out and having an ongoing dialog with
them. We did this in Sierra Leone through our outreach and legacy
program. The cornerstone of the Special Court's outreach program
was the introduction of a "town hall meeting," which I originally
started upon my arrival in Sierra Leone.
During my first four months in the country, I literally walked the
entire countryside. I listened to my clients-the people of Sierra
Leone-who told me about what took place there during the decade-
long civil war. It allowed me, in some small way, to appreciate the
pain and the suffering that took place. Additionally, it allowed them
to see their Prosecutor and to ask him questions. During the three
years this program was in place, I spoke to thousands upon thousands
of West Africans, returning many times to report on how their Court
was doing. Augmented by an Outreach Office within the Registry,
the program became a huge success. The International Criminal
Court has established a similar program, modeled on our work in
Sierra Leone.
Legacy is also a key to success for any tribunal. From the very
beginning we attempted many programs, some with great success.
Our goal was to leave a dedicated cadre of lawyers, investigators,
and court administrators in Sierra Leone who could begin to rebuild
the devastated judiciary and begin to establish a respect for the rule
of law. The legacy program is ongoing, even as I speak. I left Sierra
Leone this past summer secure in the knowledge that West Africans
understood that the law can be fair, that no one is above the law, and
that the rule of law is more powerful than the rule of the gun-just
ask former President Charles Taylor.
C. WITNESS MANAGEMENT PROGRAM
Any prosecutor worth his salt will ensure that his witnesses are
accounted and cared for in an appropriate way. This is no different at
the international level; yet prior to our arrival in West Africa, a
program such as this had never been attempted before. Due to the
fact that all of our evidence would come from witness testimony, we
needed to ensure their testimony was truthful and accurate, and that
they were secure in the knowledge that they would be protected,
based on the threat level assessed over time.
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Our intent, working with the Victims and Witness Support Unit
within the Registry, was to make sure that all witnesses for the
prosecution arrived safe, healthy, briefed, and with a knowledge of
the process they were about to undergo. For witnesses in a third
world setting with competing cultural perspectives, this could take up
to two years, particularly for those child and female victims of
horrors not describable in this setting. Of the five hundred witnesses
who testified or who are testifying, less than one percent eventually
refused to testify. Only one witness died and that was due to natural
causes. This is a credit to our witness management team.
D. CHARGING AND FORMATTING
Early on in the prosecution plan, I wanted to change the way
persons accused of international crimes are charged. My review of
indictments coming out of the other tribunals showed that those
indictments were too long, inaccurate, and fraught with potential
legal land mines. This had to change.
What I finally decided was to make the indictment simple and
direct. As a prosecutor in the United States, I firmly believe in the
principle that if you plead it, you have to prove it. Thus we did
something that had never been done before-notice pleading. The
indictments are shorter, tighter, and cleaner, yet give the indictees the
degree of notice required for them to understand the crimes they
committed, where they committed them, and when. These
indictments have withstood legal challenge, and we are currently
prosecuting based on the charges within them. I firmly believe that
this is the appropriate direction that the drafting of indictments needs
to take.
V. LESSONS LEARNED
Realistic Mandate: The mandate of a tribunal has to be realistic.
We were able to do our work efficiently and effectively because we
had a workable mandate, which matched the expectations of the
international community. "Greatest responsibility" was the key
phrase within the mandate that permitted the tribunal in Sierra Leone
to succeed. 1 The numbers of individuals that we now considered to
11. See supra notes 9-10 and surrounding text.
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indict went from 30,000 to around 20.12 We could get the job done in
a politically acceptable time frame.
Proximate Location: Another lesson learned is that a tribunal is
most effective when it is located in the region of the conflict. To the
extent that this can be done, regional tribunals need to be located
right where the crimes took place. It allows for the victims to see
justice done and renews or restores a faith in the rule of the law. The
downside to such placement is security, as recent events in Iraq
illustrate.
Local Outreach: Outreach is essential to assist in the
understanding of the importance of the rule of law and international
justice. A tribunal can only complete its work if the citizens of the
region appreciate and understand why it is the international
community that is there seeking justice and accounting for the
various international crimes allegedly committed. At the end of the
day, it will be the people living in the area who will have to live with
the results.
Delimited Timeframe: A tribunal also must be done with its work
in five years or less. Tribunals all have one common thread, namely
politics. Without the political support of the citizens, the various
States, the region, or the international community in general, a
tribunal will not completely succeed in appropriately seeking justice
for the victims of the atrocities that have taken place. The longer the
tribunal remains, the greater the chances that the vital support of the
populace and their political leaders will begin to fade. This has
already happened in Rwanda and to some extent in the Balkans. 3
Auxiliary Truth Commission: A further lesson learned is that a
truth commission is essential to building a sustainable peace. We
12. See The Secretary General, Special Court for Sierra Leone Completion
Strategy, 1, 7-8, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/59/816, S/2006/350 (May 26, 2005) (reporting that the Special Court
has issued indictments for thirteen war criminals, two of whom have subsequently
died, and two of whom remain at large).
13. Time may also preclude a sense of justice, as seen recently in the reaction
to the death of Slobodan Milosevic. See, e.g., Roger Cohen, To His Death in Jail,
Milosevic Exalted Image of Serb Suffering, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 2006, at Al
("The trial of Mr. Milosevic, endlessly long and now forever inconclusive, seems
to have done little to provide the sort of clear accounting that would have served a
Balkan future by making history, and particularly Serbian responsibility, clear.").
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were able to show that both a truth commission and a war crimes
tribunal could work side by side in helping to restore peace to a
country and to a region. 14 In my mind, and I have stated this many
times publicly, you must have both truth and justice to ensure that a
sustainable peace develops. One without the other makes the peace
somewhat illusory. Simply put, truth plus justice equals a sustainable
peace.
Experienced Jurists: The true Achilles heel to any tribunal is the
experience of the judges who are appointed to try the cases and hear
the various appeals. The chambers need experienced criminal jurists.
Experience has shown that the criteria for judges at the international
level is questionable and needs to be reviewed.
Local Professionals: Hiring local nationals is also a key to
success. We hired professionals from the region from the very start
of our work and were very proud of the dedication and the bravery of
our African colleagues. There was not one time when I doubted the
abilities of our West African trial counsel and investigators. The
experience and training they gained dovetailed quite nicely into our
legacy program, where they will remain to continue the fight to
return the rule of law to the region.
Incorporation of Local Culture: Consideration of regional cultures
establishes confidence in the rule of law. The people have to
understand that the justice we are seeking is the justice that will aid
them in restoring their societies to a proper balance. Cultural
perspectives must be respected and factored into the prosecutorial
strategy and plan. This also assists the investigators and witness
managers in preparing West African witnesses to testify before an
international tribunal in a way that they understand.
VI. CHALLENGES AHEAD
With respect to the direction in which international criminal law
should progress, I envision three considerations or challenges: (1)
14. See The Secretary General, Report of the Planning Mission on the
Establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, at 10-11, delivered to the
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/20021246 (Mar. 6, 2002) (explaining the
relationship between the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special
Court, addressing their respective mandates, jurisdiction, and information-sharing,
while identifying areas of cooperation and potential conflict).
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indifference; (2) political resolve; and (3) mandate enforcement.
Allow me briefly to explain each one.
Indifference: My biggest challenge was the indifference of the
international community towards the work of the tribunal. This war
crimes weary world, particularly as it related to Africa, simply feels
incapable in dealing with the atrocities. The ruin of over one million
lives still did not stir the hearts of the western world.1 5
Political Resolve: Additionally, a further challenge was sustaining
the will to see a successful tribunal through to a just conclusion. Half
way through the life of the Special Court, we simply ran out of
donations and had to scramble to seek a subvention grant from the
United Nations to see us through our third year. Currently, we are
seeking donations for the fourth year.
Mandate Enforcement: A tribunal can only be successful if those
properly indicted under statutory guidelines and the laws are turned
over to it for a fair trial. This is certainly true in the case of the
Special Court. Charles Taylor remains in political limbo in Calabar,
Nigeria after I unsealed the seventeen-count indictment against him
in June of 2003.16 At the time, it was the appropriate thing to do; get
him out of Liberia so the peace process could move forward in
Accra, Ghana. 7 However, it has been over two years, and Nigeria no
longer has any standing to keep him in violation of both their
15. Cf Nicholas Kristof, What's to Be Done About Darfur? Plenty, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 29, 2005, at A23 (arguing that the U.S. government acquiescence in
Darfur is fueled by the same public indifference manifested during other such
atrocities throughout modem history: "[t]here is no public outcry").
16. See Prosecutor v. Taylor, Case No. SCSL-2003-01-1, Indictment Against
Charles Ghankay Taylor (Mar. 7, 2003) (indicting Charles Taylor on seventeen
counts, including terrorizing the civilian population and collective punishments,
unlawful killings, sexual violence, physical violence, use of child soldiers,
abductions and forced labor, looting and burning, and attacks on UNAMSIL
personnel).
17. See Press Release, Special Court for Sierra Leone Office of the Prosecutor,
At Second Anniversary of the Unsealing of Taylor's Indictment Prosecutor Says
"Charles Taylor Holds a Sword Over the Future of West Africa" (June 3, 2005)
(explaining that Charles Taylor's removal from Liberia, through an exile
agreement made with the Nigerian government, made sense in order to lessen his
obstruction of the peace process).
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domestic law and international law. There can be no African
exception to the Nuremberg principles that we celebrate this year.18
VII. CRIMINAL WARFARE-A RELATIVELY
NEW PHENOMENON
I have been in public service my entire adult life, many of those
years in harms way. Yet, when I arrived in West Africa, I faced a
new combatant, the international criminal element. That element
formed a joint criminal enterprise in West Africa led by three sitting
presidents, Muammar Qadhafi, Charles Taylor, and Blaise Compaore
of Burkina Faso.19 Over a period often years, these individuals-one
indicted, one named and shamed, and the other warned away-led
gun runners, diamond dealers, Eastern European mafias, other
international thugs, and terrorists, including Hezbollah and al Qaeda,
in a whirlwind of death and destruction the likes of which the world
has never seen. That it all occurred at the end of the twentieth
century is a sad commentary of mankind.
The unrest throughout the West African region, particularly in
Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, and Liberia, was started by criminals
for their own personal and criminal gain. The civil war in Sierra
Leone did not begin on account of the more traditional causes behind
warfare, legitimate or otherwise, such as political, religious, cultural,
ethnic, or social reasons. Rather, the impetus for the civil war was
pure criminal avarice and greed. They did it because they could.
Where there is no law, there is anarchy.
There are two aspects to West Africa, the West Africa you see and
the West Africa that is. The West Africa that is was the realm in
which these criminals operated for over thirty years-each of them
18. See U.N. GAOR, Int'l Law Comm'n, Report of the International Law
Commission on Its Second Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/34 (June 5-July 29, 1950)
(summarizing the principles that guided the Nuremberg Tribunal and continue to
lay the foundation for international criminal law, which includes holding
responsible those who commit war crimes, even if they were acting as a Head of
State).
19. Blaise Compaore, President of Burkina Faso, first took office in 1991 after
an unopposed election; he was re-elected in 1998 for a second seven-year term. See
U.S. State Dep't, Bureau of African Affairs, Background Note: Burkina Faso
(Aug. 2005), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2834.htm.
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drinking out of the public trough, resulting in widespread corruption,
lack of hope, and massive international crimes.
CONCLUSION
International criminal justice can be effectively and efficiently
delivered within a politically acceptable time frame. The
international war crimes tribunal in West Africa, the Special Court
for Sierra Leone, has shown that it can be done. Regional hybrid
arrangements are effective in delivering justice directly to the
victims, their families, districts, and towns; and they can work in the
paradigm of the Rome Statute that established the International
Criminal Court. 0 We now have the tools in place to face down
impunity wherever it rears its ugly head On the sixtieth anniversary
of the Nuremberg Trials, we must continue to ensure that the rule of
law is the guiding principle for good governance and a world at
peace.
20. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, arts. 1, 5, July 17, 1998,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (1998) (establishing the International Criminal Court in
order to prosecute the "most serious crimes of concern to the international
community," which include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
the crime of aggression).
516 [21:505
